 Kambol (Phnom  Penh, Cambodia). 26/05/2009: The court building on day 21 of Duch's trial at the  ECCC©John Vink/ Magnum
Kambol (Phnom  Penh, Cambodia). 26/05/2009: The court building on day 21 of Duch's trial at the  ECCC©John Vink/ Magnum
  
By Stéphanie  Gée
26-05-2009
The hearing of Tuesday May 26th was marked by a  statement from the accused Duch aimed to explain, among others, that the  personal conflict between the secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist  Party, Le Duan, and Brother nº1, Pol Pot, degenerated into a bloodbath. Indian  journalist Nayan Chanda, specialist on political issues in Indochina, finished  his testimony, not without recalling Vietnam's dampened hopes in relation to its  Khmer Rouge comrades. After him, Craig Etcheson came back to the stand, once  again more as a matter of form...
The fate of the “Hanoi  Khmer”
Nayan Chanda recalled that in 1975 and 1976, Vietnamese  officials made visits to Cambodia, in what were as many attempts for  negotiations that all failed. At the most, as the Indian expert remembered,  local agreements were made in the months following the Khmer Rouge victory in  April 1975, which allowed for the forced repatriation to Cambodia by the  Vietnamese authorities of Khmer nationals who had taken refuge on their soil. In  some cases, these repatriations were carried out on the basis of one person  being exchanged for one head of cattle.
Nayan Chanda then read a relevant  section taken from David Chandler's book “Voices from S-21: Terror and History  in Pol Pot's Secret Prison”: “He wrote that the accused was able to elaborate a  very sophisticated concept of treason, between 1972 and 1973. It discussed  chains of traitors and a secret operation that was then implemented by the Khmer  Rouge to purge those who were called the 'Hanoi Khmer', who had come back in  1970 after years of exile in Northern Vietnam to help the revolution there. In  1973, hundreds of them were arrested and assassinated in the utmost secrecy,  after Vietnamese had withdrawn most of their troops from Cambodia. Some managed  to flee to Vietnam after their detention, others were arrested after April 1975,  many were arrested in the special zone. The stealthy and pitiless aspects of  this purge campaign may have answered to the emerging administrative style that  was specific to Duch. This campaign already foretold the operating mode of  S-21.”
Vietnam's disappointed hopes
Before an open  conflict broke out between Cambodia and Vietnam, the latter long believed that  it could count on friends in the Khmer Rouge ranks, before gradually opening  their eyes. The Indian journalist recalled a “tactical alliance between the  Vietnamese communist party and the Cambodian communist party in 1974.” “Back  then,”he pursued, “it was patent that the United States were going to withdraw  from the region and the Khmer Rouge would be able to take power in Cambodia. At  that time, the Vietnamese were ready to help the Khmer Rouge. On April 17th  1975, the Khmer Rouge victory was made possible thanks to the considerable  amount of weapons and trainings provided by the Vietnamese to the Khmer Rouge in  late 1974. The Chinese had then not been able to give such assistance, because  they had no means available. […] It was therefore the Vietnamese communist party  that provided a very valuable assistance to the Khmer Rouge to allow them to  reach victory in 1975. So, there is aberration somewhere in what is otherwise a  fundamentally conflictual relationship. I have the feeling that the Vietnamese  hoped that, by helping the Khmer Rouge in this way, they could win them over to  their own way of looking at things. But their reckoning was erroneous, as it was  realised subsequently. As soon as victory was theirs, the Khmer Rouge declared  they had obtained it on their own, without any foreign assistance. […] Vietnam  understood immediately that there was no gratitude to expect from the Khmer  Rouge.”
The expert added that the Vietnamese misinterpreted the situation  as they seemed to think they had more friends than they really did within the  Khmer Rouge revolutionary ranks. “I have recently read a research paper written  by a Russian on the relations between Cambodia and Vietnam, on the basis of  Soviet diplomatic materials recently made public. The author wrote that Nuon  Chea [ex-Brother nº2 and indicted by the tribunal] was the person appointed by  Pol Pot to go and ask for help in Vietnam on the eve of Phnom Penh's fall. He  was the party's Mister Vietnam... […] Until 1978, the Vietnamese thought that  Nuon Chea was a moderate and a friend of Vietnam!”
However, Nayan Chanda  believed that from late 1977, “Vietnam seemed to have understood it was not an  issue of misunderstanding or resolution of some territorial disputes, but that  the conflict with Cambodia pertained to the Khmer Rouge policy towards Vietnam.  The problem was therefore to be solved through a political change in Phnom Penh  or a change of the people in power in Phnom Penh. In other words, if there were  changes within the Communist Party of Kampuchea [CPK], that was fine, but if  that was not the case, it was necessary to take Phnom Penh to ensure peace and  stability.”
Duch: the personal conflict between Le Duan and Pol  Pot resulted in bloodshed
When his turn to interrogate Nayan Chanda  came, Duch's international lawyer requested that first, the accused be given the  opportunity to respond to the expert's testimony. Duch then started a long  statement, in which he lashed out at Brother nº1:
“It was part of the  implementation of Hô Chi Minh's theory, which said that the only main cause was  the fight against the French. Consequently, there could only be one party in  power, the Communist Party of Indochina: one party, one soldier, one government  and one country, that is the Indochinese Federation. This was his theory. It was  the source of life and death, and the hostility between Le Duan and Pol Pot. Le  Duan was secretary of the Vietnam Workers' Party, which later became the  Vietnamese Communist Party. […] The conflict between the two men was a mortal  conflict, a long-standing one, that started as early as 1954. Le Duan saw  himself as the father of Indochina, even if there was a Geneva Conference. Both  tried to overthrow the other. […] Although the armed conflict existed, Le Duan  wanted Pol Pot to follow him... […] The dispute led to the open armed conflict  in 1978, which came to the attention of the international community on December  31st 1978. I want to say that Pol Pot and Le Duan were having a personal  dispute. Each had his own party, his own soldiers, and this resulted in a  bloodbath and had a disastrous impact on the lives of the civilian population.  What I am saying is that Pol Pot was not a great patriot of the country, but he  was a murderer. He was the father of the murder of Cambodia. […] So, I maintain  my view, that it was a dispute between Pol Pot and the Indochinese Federation  which was at the origin of the conflict in which Pol Pot was a murderer. More  than a million people lost their lives. In this context, in S-21, my hands were  stained with the blood of the people who lost their lives there... I do not deny  my responsibility for this crime. However, I want to show that […] Vietnamese  and Cambodian blood was shed again and again because of the dispute between  these two persons.”
What is at stake with Nayan Chanda's  summoning, according to François Roux
Rather than interrogating the  expert, François Roux explained to him that the meaning of his presence was  fully realised in light of the attempts of the office of the co-Prosecutors to  demonstrate and obtain a decision from the Trial Chamber saying that [with  reference to the final submission of the co-Prosecutors made at the end of the  investigation phase] '[T]he evidence on the Case File [...] establishes that an  international armed conflict existed between the armed forces of Democratic  Kampuchea (DK) and the armed forces of Vietnam from April 1975 and continuing  until 6 January 1979.' This question, which is not only political but also  legal, could bear consequences as, if it is considered that an armed conflict  existed since April 1975, this would mean that all the Vietnamese prisoners sent  to S-21 from that time were victims of war crimes. That is what is at stake  here. This does not yield a great interest for Duch, since he has always  recognised he knew since September 1977 there was an open conflict between  Cambodia and Vietnam. He also admitted that, at least for the whole year of  1978, the Vietnamese prisoners who had arrived were victims of war crimes that  came under his responsibility. […] The dispute bears little impact on Duch's  guilt. However, I have drawn the Chamber's attention to the responsibility that  the co-Prosecutors wanted to place upon international criminal justice. That is,  until now, we have always heard the official view according to which the  international armed conflict had started from December 31st 1977, when  diplomatic relations were severed, and now, the co-Prosecutors are asking the  Chamber to take the heavy decision to contradict, through a decision of justice,  that date. […] The co-Prosecutors have asked you to come here to see if you  would confirm this simple sentence: an international armed conflict existed  between the armed forces of Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam from April 1975 to  January 6th 1979. I note that you have not confirmed that sentence. On the  contrary, I note that you have indicated there were many clashes and occasional  fighting of the military, and you have said 'I have the feeling that, in late  1977, the Vietnamese had concluded it was not a misunderstanding.' You also said  yesterday [Monday May 25th 2009] that until late 1977, the Vietnamese government  had tried to prevent the conflict from deteriorating. Have I heard correctly,  Mister Chanda?”
Nayan Chanda confirmed while wondering: “However, I am  not a jurist. I do not know how war is defined in law. Must it be declared? Can  war exist without any declaration? If it is not necessary to have a declaration,  then the two countries were at war since 1975. If it is necessary, then war  effectively started only on December 31st 1977.”
This was the end of the  questions to the former correspondent of the Far Eastern Economic Review, who  was replaced by Craig Etcheson, whose examination resumed after being  interrupted on Thursday May 21st.
Craig Etcheson's examination  resumes on an air of “deja vu”
International co-Prosecutor Alex  Bates then resumed where he had stopped, and started again the reading, tedious  due to translation difficulties, of the minutes of a meeting which Duch attended  and during which S-21 and the divisions were ordered to collaborate in the  implementation of the purge policy. There was like an air of “deja vu” and the  translation issues drowned the co-Prosecutor's demonstration, which some thought  had already been made on May 21st...
Alex Bates then sought to  interrogate the U.S. expert on nine letters from Sou Meth, the former commandant  of division 502 of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, sent to Duch between  April and October 1977. His endeavour was interrupted by François Roux, on the  basis of the same arguments that Duch's lawyer had made the previous Wednesday  [May 20th]. This had already brought the debates to a standstill and resulted in  a decision of the Chamber the next day [May 21st], which appears to have been  partial in light of the continuing debate. The co-Prosecutor called the  defence's objection an “absurdity” and recalled that “all the pieces of evidence  are free and once presented, their value can be assessed.” The civil party  lawyers, one after the other, joined him, which led Roux to observe that, each  time the defence made an objection, they had “not only one but many opponents.”  “I end up wondering where the equality of arms is in this trial?” He explained  again that it was not the nature of the documents that bothered him and that his  client was quite ready to comment on them. For him, the problem was that Craig  Etcheson be presented with documents he became aware of after July 2007, that is  after the start of the investigation procedure against Duch, as the expert  worked as an investigator at the office of the co-Prosecutors and his testimony  could therefore be flawed with lack of partiality. Finally, Roux wondered that  the co-Prosecutors did not summon Sou Meth before the co-Investigating Judges or  the Chamber to confront him with Duch... A misunderstanding seemed to settle  regarding the substance of the defence's objection. Judge Lavergne then  suggested as an arrangement that the expert's answers be taken with caution, in  light of his current post.
Once more, Craig Etcheson was little heard.  The final word went to a Cambodian civil party lawyer, Hong Kim Suon: “We have  already lost a lot of time not so wisely. […] To revive the same debate is to  reopen the same Pandora box. I feel like we are going round and round.” The  president then adjourned the hearing...